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Due to hardware developments, strong application needs and the overwhelming influence of
the net in almost all areas, distributed and mobile systems, especially software systems, have
become one of the most important topics for nowadays software industry. Unfortunately, distri-
bution adds its share to the problems of developing complex software systems. Heterogeneity in
both, hardware and software, concurrency, distribution of components and the need for inter-
operability between different systems complicate matters. Moreover, new technical aspects like
resource management, load balancing and deadlock handling put an additional burden onto the
developer. Although subject to permanent changes, distributed systems have high requirements
w.r.t. dependability, robustness and performance.
The long-term common goal of our research efforts is the development, implementation and
evaluation of methods helpful for the development of robust and easy-to-use software for com-
plex systems in general while putting a focus on the problems and issues regarding the software
development for distributed as well as mobile systems on all levels. Our current research acti-
vities are focussed on different aspects centered around that theme:
• Robust and adaptive Service-oriented Architectures: Development of design methods, lan-
guages and middleware to ease the development of SOAs with an emphasis on provable
correct systems that allow for early design-evaluation due to rigorous development me-
thods and tools. Additionally, we work on approaches to autonomic components and
container-support for such components in order to ensure robustness also at runtime.
• Agent and Multi-Agent (MAS) Technology: Development of new approaches to use Multi-
Agent-Systems and negotiation techniques, for designing, organizing and optimizing com-
plex distributed systems, esp. service-based architectures.
• Peer-to-Peer Systems: Development of algorithms, techniques and middleware suitable for
building applications based on unstructured as well as structured P2P systems. A specific
focus is put on privacy as well as anonymity issues.
• Context-Models and Context-Support for small mobile devices: Investigation of techni-
ques for providing, representing and exchanging context information in networks of small
mobile devices like, e.g. PDAs or smart phones. The focus is on the development of a tru-
ly distributed context model taking care of information reliability as well as privacy issues.
• Visual Programming- and Design-Languages: The goal of this long-term effort is the uti-
litization of visual metaphores and languages as well as visualization techniques to make
design- and programming languages more understandable and, hence, easy-to-use.
More information about our work, i.e., projects, papers and software, is available at our ho-
mepage. If you have any questions or suggestions regarding this report or our work in general,
don’t hesitate to contact me at guido.wirtz@wiai.uni-bamberg.de
Guido Wirtz
Bamberg, April 2006
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Abstract Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) promise a new advance in distributed computing. In
MAS autonomous software agents flexibly cooperate, coordinate and compete to provide the
desired function(s) of such a system. If some components of a MAS fail or do not provide
the desired functionality, the system is expected to autonomously deal with these situations.
It is desirable to reduce occurrences of such situations by selecting trustworthy cooperation
partners before cooperating with them. This becomes even more desirable and important in
an open MAS where arbitrary heterogeneous software agents, deployed by different parties,
participate in the MAS, as it becomes more likely that these agents fail or try to exploit the
MAS for their own purposes without reciprocation. In order to monitor agent behavior and
enable selection of trustworthy cooperation partners, trust or reputation management services
can be applied. As there is no central control in an open MAS and it is completely distributed
these services itself have to be distributed. This paper proposes a fully distributed reputation
management service for open MAS based on peer-to-peer technology (especially distributed
hash tables). A Java-based implementation of that service, which is intended as a plug-in for
multi-agent platforms, is also described.
Keywords Reputation management, trust, software agents, cooperative problem solving,
multi-agent systems
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11 Necessity for trust in open Multi-Agent Systems
This paper describes a fully distributed reputation management scheme to establish trust in
open Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). Reputation management can be used as a foundation for
agents to select trustworthy cooperation partners. For this purpose the paper is organized
as follows. This section motivates why distributed reputation management is necessary in
open MAS and describes the characteristics of open MAS. The second section exemplifies,
which requirements reputation management for open MAS must meet, while the third section
deals with the architecture of the proposed reputation management. Section four explains the
protocols employed to implement distributed reputation management. The succeeding section
describes how the proposed reputation management has been implemented in Java. The last
section summarizes the results of this paper and addresses open issues and future extensions of
our approach.
1.1 Multi-Agent Systems
Agents seem to be the next promising paradigm in Software Engineering for complex distributed
systems. Currently there is no consensus on a definition what an agent is, but most definitions
agree that an agent has to be autonomous, situated in an environment and must be able to
percept its environment and react to and change the environment [JSW98]. Furthermore a
single agent can be reactive or a complex deliberative entity. A reactive agent autonomously
takes actions based on perceptions just made from its environment, whereas a deliberative agent
can be characterized as autonomously planning its (current and future) actions based on an
internal environment model.
A MAS is according to [JSW98]
”
a loosely coupled network of problem solvers that work together
to solve problems that are beyond the individual capabilities or knowledge of each problem
solver”. These MASs can be constructed (i) with help of top-down/divide-and-conquer approach
or by (ii) a bottom-up approach by composing individual agents or groups of agents with
different capabilities and knowledge. For (i) all problem solving and communication strategies
become a hard-wired integral part of a MAS. Whereas (ii) requires coordination and negotiation
between agents to achieve a solution for their problem(s). It must be possible for agents
themselves and users of the MAS to define new goals as there is no hard-wired overall system goal
provided at design time of the MAS. A MAS can be described by the following characteristics:
• Each agent has limited capabilities and knowledge to solve problem(s) for itself
• There exists no global control.
• Data storage is decentralized.
• Computation is asynchronous.
• The configuration of a MAS is heterogeneous regarding the agents.
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• A MAS can be closed or open. In closed MAS only agents specified at design time can
take actions as described by the design. Closed MAS are most likely the result of a top-
down/divide-and-conquer design appraoch. In a open MAS agents can leave and enter at
runtime as they desire.
• A MAS is expected to operate in a highly dynamic environment, which on the one hand
may result from its openness and on the other hand the nature of its environment.
In open MAS, that are for example deployed on the internet, agents of different designers may
enter the system and have their own (possibly selfish) goals. Because of these agents and their
autonomy new patterns of cooperation and behaviors may emerge. It is important to ensure
that autonomy of agents and emergence of new features of a MAS do not destroy or disturb
the functions and goals, which the MAS was designed to achieve. In order to ensure the proper
function and achievement of goals of agents, that are already part of the MAS, mechanisms to
prevent disadvantages for these agents have to be implemented.
1.2 Cooperative Problem Solving in MAS
In MAS agents have to cooperate to achieve their goals, as single agents often have limited
resources, capabilities, or knowledge.
Cooperation in MAS can be structured with help of the Cooperative Problem Solving (CPS)
process ([WJ99], [DKV03]). CPS is divided into four phases: recognition, team formation, plan
formation, and team action.
1. Recognition: At least one agent must recognize that there is the need or potential for
cooperation. Furthermore a group of agents, that can cooperate must be identified.
2. Team Formation: In this phase the agents try to let all other agents know that there is a
cooperation possible. If this phase is successful a potential team has been found.
3. Plan Formation: Now the agents try to find a common plan to achieve their goal(s). If
they find and agree upon a common plan they engage into a joint commitment. They
promise each other to carry out their plan. If there is no agreement on a common plan
the cooperation fails.
4. Team Action: In this last phase the agents carry out the plan agreed upon before.
This phases have not to be processed sequentially. CPS is rather an iterative process and some
of the phases may be left out. If one phase fails, agents can go back to an earlier phase.
For CPS to be successfully carried out, agents must reveal their true goal(s). They must fulfill
the tasks, that have been assigned to them as desired by the whole team. It is assumed that all
agents are sincere and reveal their true goal(s). This cannot be assumed in an open MAS, as
the developers of agents may have bad intentions. There may for example exist some agents,
that just want to disturb the correct function of a MAS (denial of service), or agents that just
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pretend to cooperate to achieve their goals with less costs, but do not fulfill their share (free
riding).
In order for CPS to be successful in open MAS, agents must have a basis for the decision with
which agents to cooperate. So that they in phase two (team formation) can decide which agents
should be in the team as they will most likely fulfill their assigned tasks. In phase three it is
helpful to have knowledge about the reliability of agents regarding the tasks they can carry out
in order to assign them to the most reliable agents. After the fourth phase of CPS has been
carried out in an open MAS a fifth phase, which records the experiences agents make with each
other should follow. One possibility explored in MAS research to identify and exclude agents
that behave badly is Trust Management ([CF98], [WS00], [GLd02], [SS02a]). Before section 1.4
describes the properties of trust and reputation, the following section describes some services
that are required for open MAS.
1.3 Multi-Agent platforms
For execution of software agents runtime environments and services are required. These services
comprise - among other things - life-cycle-management, directory services, and communication
services [FIP02], to find and communicate with cooperation partners for CPS. In this paper a
runtime environment providing such services is called an agent platform (or just platform).
To provide an open MAS it must be possible that agent platforms on different machines can
be connected to facilitate cooperation between the agents residing to these platforms. It must
also be possible that new platforms and new agents can enter the MAS at runtime.
Because of this dynamic nature of open MAS it is reasonable to base a MAS on Peer-to-Peer
(P2P) technologies, as these kind of systems provide mechanisms to dynamically handle arrival
and departure of new machines in a network. The services (e.g. discovery services) required
by agents are then provided by all the platforms that are connected within the P2P network
to equally distribute load and make the whole network scalable as with the arrival of new
platforms, these platforms will also provide new resources.
One further service that should be provided by agent platforms to better support CPS is a
service to keep track of agent behavior. This service should also be distributed equally among
platforms participating within the P2P network, but should be seen as a logical central unit.
On the one hand distribution of such a service among platforms ensures that there exists no
single point of failure or a single entity that can be attacked. On the other hand distribution
facilitates that platforms deny to fulfill their duty in provision of the service. All the same in
an open MAS where agents and platforms of different parties can leave and enter as they desire
a fully distributed service is more desirable so that every participant has to provide the same
resources to the open MAS. As mentioned in the previous section one possibility explored in
MAS research to identify and exclude agents that behave badly is trust management, which can
be based on so-called reputation management. As current platforms have no built-in service
for trust or reputation management, developing such a service is the goal of our work. Before
defining the requirements on such a system, some required terms regarding trust and reputation
are defined in the next subsection.
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1.4 Trust and Reputation
Trust can be used as a foundation for reasoning about with whom to interact in situations where
only partial information about the partner is available and there is a risk that the interaction
may be harmful. Trust depends on situation and the context, in which it is validated [CSG+03].
Trust between two individuals is not necessarily symmetric. In MAS the context, in which an
agent can be trusted, can be defined by using the role an agent plays [CBG02].
The primary source used for building trust to someone is a subjective image [SS02b] one can
have of the other party. If such an image is not available, one has to resort to other information
sources as e.g. a reputation management system which provides reputation values. Reputa-
tion management [ZM00] facilitates estimation of trust between agents based on a history of
interactions.
Reputation management is mostly realized with help of a central trusted entity, which stores
reputation values for pairs of agents that have interacted before. If such a central entity is
present, an agent can ask it (instead of asking all agents known by it) for all interactions,
in which the agent under consideration has been involved, and how other agents rated these
interactions.
In order to make reputation and trust interpretable and computable by software it is often
represented by numerical values (e.g. real numbers between 0 and 1). The reputation value for
a single agent is then computed with help of a so-called reputation or trust metric [GH04].
Reputation information about an agent can be seen by all other agents including the affected
agent itself. Therefore the agent can estimate if other agents have trust in it and how it is
rated compared to other agents. This will give the agent an incentive to keep its reputation as
high as possible by behaving well in any interaction. Ratings of agents that rated others, but
have already left the system are still maintained by the reputation management. According to
Figure 1: The three ’dimensions’ of trust.
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[SS02b], reputation can be structured in three dimensions 1:
• Individual dimension: This dimension deals with the direct interaction between two
agents. Through the direct interactions agents get the most reliable (although subjective)
information about others.
• Social dimension: If an agent had no direct contact with a potential interaction partner,
it has no information about it and therefore it may try to get information about other
agents by asking other agents. While doing that it must be considered that the information
gathered from other agents is also subjective.
• Ontological dimension: it can be used in these other dimensions to calculate reputation
based on ontological relationships between behaviors of agents. Trust is related to a single
behavioral aspect (context). The ontological dimension makes it possible to describe
relations between different aspects to allow computation of more complex trust values.
Figure 1 shows possible relationships between the three ’dimensions’ of trust. To compute a
trust value for an agent different sources of information may be combined. E.g. an agent can
retrieve reputation values from other agents (social) regarding one cooperation partner in a
certain role A and combine these with the its experiences (individual) it made with that agent
playing role A and playing ohter roles that are related to A (ontological).
In an open MAS the individual dimension should be supported by each single agent itself. The
social dimension can be realized with help of a concept called web of trust or with help of a
central entity that keeps a history of agent behavior. In order to determine if an agent can trust
a new cooperation partner, in a web of trust it uses its relationships to other agents it knows
to query for experiences the other agents eventually made with the potential partner. For this
purpose it must also trust in the recommendations of its acquaintances and keep track of these.
In order to support the social dimension of trust and make it easier to compute reputation for an
unknown cooperation partner a central entity seems to be more promising. It saves reputation
values for pairs of agents that have interacted before. If such a central entity were present, an
agent could ask a single entity (instead of asking all agents known by it) for all interactions, in
which the affected agent has been involved, and how the other agents rated these interactions.
Such a foundation for creation of trust between agents based on historical interactions is called
reputation management ( [ARH00], [ZM00]). Reputation information about an agent can be
seen by all other agents including the affected agent itself. Therefore the agent can estimate if
other agents have trust in it and how it is rated compared to other agents. This will give the
agent an incentive to keep its reputation as high as possible by behaving well in any interaction.
Ratings of agents that rated others, but have already left the system are still maintained by
the reputation management, which amplifies the availability of information about agents.
The ontological dimension of trust can be addressed if agents reputations refer to the role(s) an
agent played in CPS. A role according to [PV02] ’cluster types of behavior into a meaningful
unit that contributes to an overall goal’. These roles can provide the context for the trust that
1In opinion of the authors the term ’dimension’ does not fit very well, as the individual, social, and ontological
aspects of trust are not always orthogonal to each other. How they are combined may depend on the application
domain.
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an agent can have in another agent. There may exist relations between roles that allow to infer
trust from the behavior of one agent within one role from the behavior in another role. For
example we may trust a car mechanic more to fix a bicycle than a clerk.
Our approach assists the social dimension by providing a reputation management service which
itself is completely distributed. The ontological dimension can be addressed with help of the
roles an agent plays, but is not covered in this paper. In our approach each single agent is
responsible for the individual dimension on its own.
2 Requirements on Reputation Management
This section deals with the requirements on reputation management in open MAS based on
the characterizations of MAS and reputation management from the previous section. For this
purpose the next subsection describes requirements that are directly imposed by the remarks
in the previous section. The second subsection explains the requirements additionally derived
from these basic requirements. The last subsection deals with attacks that can be performed by
agents or agent platforms to disrupt or abuse reputation management. Some of these attacks
may result from the requirements described in this section.
2.1 Basic requirements
A service for an agent platform that provides reputation management must be developed. The
reputation management service must enable agents to rate and request the reputation of other
agents. Agents must be free to leave and enter the MAS at any time. If an agent leaves and
it has gained a certain reputation it must be possible for the agent to maintain this reputation
and regain it, when it re-enters the system. This must be possible from any agent platform.
As the MAS is distributed itself and there exists no central global control, the platforms should
be organized into a P2P overlay network to facilitate an open network, where platforms (and
the agents executed by them) can join and leave at runtime. Within these network the load
and resource consumption of the reputation management service should be equally distributed
among participating platforms, so that every participant of a MAS has to provide resources
for reputation management. The load and resource consumption must be scalable with regard
to the number of participating agent platforms. By distributing reputation management in
a P2P-fashion it is more likely that is scales with the number of participating platforms and
agents.
In order to facilitate reputation management agents must be uniquely identifiable, so that they
can be rated by other agents. Therefore an identification and authentication mechanism must
be available.
As reputation is context-dependent it must be possible to save reputation information for certain
contexts. These contexts are provided by CPS processes that are conducted by the agents. It
must be possible to rate the agents with help of the role(s) they play while cooperating with
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others.
As there are already some implementations of multi-agent platforms available, these platforms
must be enabled to use the proposed reputation management. Therefore it must be developed
as kind of a plug-in for existing platforms. If in the following sections the responsibilities of
a platform are mentioned, these responsibilities are taken over by the plug-in if not stated
otherwise.
2.2 Derived requirements
To implement the requirements stated in the previous section some further requirements have
to be imposed. A P2P scalable and load balanced overlay network that provides the possibility
to store reputation data and information about agent identities must be available. For this
purpose a distributed hash table (DHT) can be used.
In a DHT data is stored on nodes (here these nodes are the agent platforms) that participate in
the P2P overlay network. Any node can manipulate the data which is stored on it. Therefore
mechanisms to ensure data integrity and consistency must be provided.
As agents can rate other agents, they influence how other agents judge about trustworthiness
of these agents. Therefore it must not be possible to rate others when there has been no
interaction between the agent providing the rating and the agent being rated.
Mechanisms must be developed that provide identification and authentication based on well-
understood cryptographic concepts. Furthermore mechanisms to handle agent arrival and de-
parture, where agents provide existing reputation data concerning them must be provided.
These mechanisms must make sure that the provided data is valid reputation data.
As agents could cooperate with the platform that is hosting them, this platform must not alone
be responsible for storage of data about these agents, because it is very likely that it removes
data that is bad for the reputation of its agents. If other platforms store data of agents of one
platform this platform must not be able to manipulate the data. Therefore it must be possible
to check the consistency of these data by the platform that hosts an agent or by the agent
itself. A platform storing data also should not be responsible for data alone, as it cannot only
manipulate data, but also remove it. Therefore reputation data should be distributed among
more than one platform.
As can be seen from this facts, trustworthiness of platforms themselves has to be tracked
with help of a platform reputation. Therefore reputation management must also manage the
reputation of agent platforms and make sure that only trustworthy platforms participate in the
P2P network.
In order to assure that agents can only rate others if there has been a transaction, transactions
must be announced to the reputation management service. The reputation management service
of an agent platform must create a unique identifier for this transaction that can only be used
once to rate other agents. As the platform can be cooperating with the agents it is hosting it
cannot alone be responsible for creating such an identifier. A mechanism that makes it possible
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to create such a transaction identifier by more than one platform must be developed.
To ensure that agents do not request a transaction identifier and they do not give a rating
for the requested transaction, a protocol must be developed, which ensures that ratings after
a transaction are delivered. Also a mechanism that motivates agents to leave the MAS in an
orderly fashion, so that their reputation data can be removed to save storage capacity, must be
developed. These two mechanisms can be realized with help of a leasing concept, where agents
must lease transactions and the storage of reputation data. This leasing mechanism must be
distributed among several platforms. It cannot be realized by the platform alone, that hosts
the agent for which it manages a lease, as the platform may cooperate with the agent.
All these mechanisms require that platforms can communicate with each other in order to
coordinate their activities. The integrity and reliability of this communication must be secured.
Different domains may require different representations for reputation values and different rep-
utation metrics. Therefore it should be possible to easily exchange the reputation value repre-
sentation and reputation metric.
2.3 Attacks on Reputation Management
Beyond these requirements the distributed reputation management service must prohibit at-
tacks that are possible on every reputation management. Furthermore attacks that can be
conducted because of the distributed nature (derived from the requirements above) of the
reputation management service have to be prevented. These attacks can be divided in two
categories. On the one hand attacks can be executed by agents, on the other hand they can be
executed by agent platforms. These attacks are listed below2.
Attacks by agents:
AA1 Pretending to be trustworthy: An agent pretends to be trustworthy for a couple of trans-
actions to create a good reputation value and then changes its behavior to exploit others.
AA2 Faked transactions: Agents rate each other without a transaction.
AA3 Faked ratings: An agent cooperates with other agents to get a high reputation value.
AA4 Harmful rating: An agent rates another agent with a bad reputation value without reason.
AA5 Change of identity: An agent leaves because of a bad reputation and creates a new identity
to get rid of the bad reputation.
AA6 Avoid rating by other agents: An agent may try to cooperate with other agents without
being rated afterwards.
Attacks by agent platforms:
2Please note, that some of these attacks cannot be handled completely by a reputation management service
alone
9PA1 Refusal of service: A platform does not save or it deletes reputation data of an agent.
PA2 Reputation data manipulation: A platform manipulates existing reputation data of an
agent.
PA3 Fake of reputation data: A platform creates fake reputation data for an agent.
PA4 Routing attack: A platform tries to manipulate the underlying peer-to-peer routing mech-
anism to make reputation data unavailable.
PA5 Denial of Service: A platform tries to make reputation data unavailable by flooding other
platforms with unnecessary requests.
PA6 Non-trustworthy platform participates: A platform that has been identified as non-
trustworthy, as it tried to perform some or one of the attacks described above, is still
or again trying to participate in reputation management.
3 Architecture
This section provides a short overview of the proposed reputation management scheme for agent
platforms. It explains the architecture of our reputation management, its single components
and their responsibilities.
The reputation management is built as a plug-in and is to be used as a basic service of agent
platforms. Its features are invoked by agent platforms using the interface of the so-called Trust
Service, either direct or through an agent running on the agent platform. The logic implemented
by the plug-in is encapsulated and only accessible through an interface. Thus, the complexity
of the application is not visible to the agent platform, the agents and their programmers.
The plug-in consists of four different layers. Each layer performs different kinds of tasks and
provides an interface to the layer above. On layer zero, sockets allow communication between
different agent platforms. In addition, a distributed hash table (DHT) stores data, such as
information about agent platforms, agents and their reputation. This information is accessible
from any agent platform inside the network, even though the requested information is not stored
on the agent platform itself.
On layer one, the Communication Service is an abstraction for sockets. This allows services on
layer two to communicate transparently with plug-ins on other agent platforms. The knowledge
which technique is used to perform this communication is not necessary. To prevent uninten-
tional communication from agent platform outside the network, the Communication Service is
also responsible for security regarding communication. In consequence, higher-level layers do
not face false requests.
Also on layer one, the Data Service provides an interface to perform requests concerning in-
formation stored in DHT. Data is stored redundantly on multiple nodes, to address security
aspects concerning data storage in an open network. Not a single agent platform is responsible
for a date, but multiple agent platforms are responsible to store it. Again, higher-level layers
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Figure 2: Architecture of reputation management service.
do not need to know which way of persistence technique is used. Thus, the data abstraction
grants the possibility to replace the employed implementation of DHT with any other persis-
tence technique. This may be of importance for integrating the plug-in into different agent
platforms.
The following services, arranged on layer two, implement the core logic for our reputation man-
agement. The Reputation Service conducts the process of rating agents and agent platforms.
This means the service calculates ratings for agents and agent platforms using a given rat-
ing metric and a reputation-value representation. They are based on data retrieved from by
Data Service. Neither the rating metric nor the rating representation is closely attached to the
Reputation Service. Due to the abstraction from concrete rating metrics and reputation-value
representation, it is possible to use different kinds of rating metrics respectively rating repre-
sentations which implements a given interface. Several techniques are implemented to avoid
false ratings from cooperating agents and wrong ratings from bad agents.
The Security Service on layer two is responsible to provide means for secure communication
between agent platforms and secure data storage in the DHT in a way that ensures data cannot
be counterfeited. This is done utilizing the techniques of signing and ciphering data using
symmetric and asymmetric algorithms. The service provides to the agent platform (and each
agent running on it) a private3 and a public key. Data stored by an agent platform has to be
signed by the agent platform itself and to prevent manipulation of this data by that platform by
another agent platform. This is done by the private key of the agent platform or respectively
of an agent. Communication is secured by symmetrical ciphering of the data stream. In
3How private data of agents and an agent platform is being secured is the responsibility of the agent platform
itself.
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order to do so, a means to create temporary session keys for ciphering the communication
between different agent platforms are provided by the Security Service. It is also responsible
for validating signatures and deciphering data. Its services are only invoked by others and it
performs no action itself.
In order to enter a network, an agent platform uses the Platform Service, which is resident
on layer two. The service is used to enter an existing network, create a new network and
to leave a network. Moreover, this service addresses data consistency in the DHT. Though
agent platforms are not allowed to store data in the DHT without an agreement of another
agent platform, data may be altered by cooperating agent platforms. In consequence, an agent
platform holding false data needs to be identified and will receive an appropriate rating. Agent
platforms with very low reputations are barred from the network.
It is not possible for the plug-in to force agents or agent platforms to use the logout function to
leave the network. Thus, it is not always possible to know if an agent is still running/working.
This means the plug-in serves reputation data about agents which are possibly not active
anymore. Also, agents requesting a ticket in order to rate each other after performing a task,
should be motivated to return it to the plug-in, in order to end the process of rating. In order
to do so a Lease Service is introduced. A corresponding lease exists for each agent logging
into the plug-in. The agent has to inform the plug-in within a certain time span to avoid an
expiration of the lease. In case the lease expires, the agent receives a bad rate. If the agent left
without notice, its reputation is downgraded each time the lease expires.
4 Protocols and counter measures against attacks
This section describes how the architecture described in section 3 is exploited to implement
a distributed reputation management. For this purpose the protocols are presented, which
allow to build a network of agent platforms. The next subsection describes the protocols
of the underlying DHT, in which most of the employed data structures are stored. Then -
before describing the protocols- some data structures and concepts used to identify agents and
platforms are explained. The succeeding sections describe how an agent platform can join
and leave the network. These are followed by protocols that describe how agents can use
the reputation management service. For each protocol -if applicable- the attacks (described
in section 2.3) are addressed, which are avoided or for which negative consequences can be
alleviated by this protocol.
4.1 Chord overlay protocols
As DHT and P2P foundation for data management in our reputation management system the
chord overlay network [SMK+01] is adopted. Chord is a structured P2P infrastructure and in
its overlay network the peers are organized into a ring. For this purpose each peer has a unique
identifier. This unique identifier is created with help of a hash function from data that uniquely
identifies the peer. The unique identifier determines the position of a peer in the ring. Because
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of the ring structure of the overlay network every node has a single predecessor and successor.
Data, that is supposed to be stored with help of chord, is also associated with a unique identifier.
With help of this unique identifier of data the peer that is responsible to store the data is
determined. A peer is responsible to store data with identifiers that are less than or equal to
its own identifier and greater than the unique identifier of its predecessor.
Figure 3: Chord routing with help of finger tables.
In order to facilitate lookup of stored data each peer maintains a routing table, the so-called
finger table. The finger table only contains references (addresses of other peers) to peers that
are responsible for data with certain identifiers. These identifiers are calculated with help
of the unique identifier of a peer (n) and the number of bits of an identifier (m) as follows:
(n + 2k−1) mod 2, 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Figure 3 shows an example in a 3 bit identifier space. On
the left hand side the intervals are depicted, for which node 1 must know other peers, that are
responsible for these intervals. The right hand side presents the finger tables of the peers with
identifiers 0, 1, and 3.
When a peer wants to store or lookup data with a certain identifier, it has to find the peer
which is responsible for data with that identifier. That means the peer that has the smallest
greater identifier of all peers compared to the identifier of the data. For this purpose the peer
asks the peer from its finger table, whose identifier is the closest preceding identifier of the data
identifier, if it knows a peer that is closer to the data identifier. If such a peer exists, this again
is asked for a closer predecessor of the data identifier. When a peer is found whose identifier is
less than the data identifier and for that the identifier of its successor is greater than the data
identifier, the successor of this peer is responsible for the data. This peer can than be requested
to store or deliver data which is associated with the data identifier. This procedure ensures
that it takes approximately log n (with n of peers in the network) steps to find a peer that is
responsible for an identifier [SMK+01]. It also guarantees to find data that is stored within the
DHT given the structure of the chord overlay network can be maintained.
To maintain the structure of chord three tasks have to be periodically performed. The first
one checks if the predecessor of a node is still alive. If the predecessor is not alive, the peer
temporarily has no predecessor. This is where the second task comes in which checks if the
successor of a peer is still available. When the successor of a peer fails, it tries to lookup a new
one again. This new successor is then informed that it has the peer, whose successor failed,
as new predecessor. With help of this two tasks the predecessor and successor relationships
within a chord overlay network are maintained. The third tasks periodically tries to find better
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entries for the finger table of a peer by using the lookup functionality of chord. A better entry
means the address of a peer whose identifier is closer (but still greater or equal) to the identifier
required for a finger-table entry.
When a peer wants to join the chord overlay network a unique identifier is assigned to it and
it searches -with help of the procedure described in the previous paragraph- for its successor.
When it has found its successor, the predecessor of this peer becomes the predecessor of the
joining peer. So it is inserted into the chord ring structure between its successor and the
former predecessor of its successor. It therefore takes over the responsibility for all identifiers
as described above and copies all data that is stored on its successor for this interval to its local
data store.
In order to avoid loss of data a replication scheme to store data on the responsible peer and its
successor can be used. To increase data reliability this can be extended by each peer having a
list of successors. The peer responsible for a data is then also responsible for replication of this
data to its successors.
If a chord overlay network is deployed in an uncertain environment where malicious peers may
participate, it cannot be assumed that all peers fulfill their duties. A peer may remove or alter
data it is responsible for or it may not replicate it. Therefore it must be ensured that a peer
cannot choose an arbitrary identifier to take possession of data with certain identifiers. And
if a peer is responsible for certain data it must be possible for it to prove that fact. To avoid
that a single peer is responsible for certain data and its replication responsibility for data must
be assigned to more than one peer, so that (assumed not all peers are malicious) data cannot
be compromised. In our reputation management system responsibility for data is assigned to
a number of peers and to ensure consistency of this data periodical checks are conducted. If
these checks reveal that data has been altered or removed this is recorded with help of a peers
reputation. When the reputation of a peer has reached a low threshold it is excluded from the
chord overlay network.
4.2 Identification of agents and agent platforms
In order to facilitate reputation management it must be possible to identify agents and agent
platforms. Agents have an identifier, which is unique within the agent platform, that hosts
the agent. Therefore the agent can be uniquely identified within a network of agent platforms
with help of its unique identifier and the unique identifier of its platform. For identification of
agents a data structure containing the identifier of the agent, the identifier of its platform, and
the public key of the agent, is provided. This data structure is signed by (at least two) agent
platforms that confirm the agents identity and is stored within the DHT.
In a similar manner an identification data structure for an agent platform is provided. It
contains the unique identifier, the address that can be used to communicate with the platform,
its identifier within the DHT, and the public key of the platform. This data structure is signed
by (at least two) other agent platforms, which by this confirm the identity of the platform.
Agents and agent platforms are, as far as the plug-in is concerned, identified by the corre-
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sponding data structures in the DHT. To better countermeasure attacks like AA5 and PA6
(refer to section 2.3) not only the technical identifiers of agents and agent platforms should
be incorporated into these data structures. They should also incorporate the identity of the
owner of the agent or platform to be able to conclude the owner’s reputation by analyzing his
agents. Thus general policies concerning agents of a particular owner can be specified. The
owner’s identity should then be certificated by a trusted third party. Then it would be pos-
sible to exclude agents or platforms of certain owners. For simplicity in our prototype these
considerations are (initially) left out. But they can be easily incorporated by treating owners
of agents as special agents with the special role owner. Then it would be possible to prevent
owners, whose agents or platforms demonstrate untrustworthy behavior, from incorporating
more agents and platforms into the distributed reputation management service. For further
discussion on identification in reputation management systems see e.g. [CP02].
4.3 A Platform joins
The join of platform to the P2P network is initialized by an agent platform administrator.
Therefore it has to be defined whether the new platform should create a new network or attend
to an existing network. For a new network no login activity is conducted.
Protocol flow
In order to join the network the plug-in contacts a trusted agent platform (the contact data is
commissioned by the administrator) with help of the Communication Service, sends its identi-
fication data, and waits for a reply. This platform decides based on the identification data of
the new platform if it may join the network. It may neglect joining of the new platform. New
generated public and private keys, signed from two trusted platforms, are handed over to the
joining platform. The unique identifier of the new platform for its position in the chord DHT
is generated from its public key. Therefore all other platforms can verify that the new platform
takes over responsibility for the data it is supposed to be responsible for. This data is also
stored in the underlying chord DHT to facilitate verification of data from the new platform and
authentication of the new platform by already participating platforms.
Afterwards the new platform joins the DHT network by searching for its successor, which
ensures (with help of the identification data of the new platform) that the new platform is
integrated in the chord DHT structure. The successor verifies with help of the identification data
of the new platform (that is available from the DHT, see above) that it really is its predecessor
and it is allowed to take over responsibility for data that is smaller than its identifier.
Counter measures against attacks
The first request to a running platform arrives at a Communication Service. In general the
request will always be discarded, if the Communication Service identifies the request as a Denial
of Service attack. This service also makes sure by involving the Reputation Service, that the
platform is trustworthy or completely unknown. If the platform has been excluded from the
system, the communication is aborted. Otherwise the request is forwarded to the Platform
4.4 A Platform leaves 15
PA5 DoS attack
PA6 Non-trustworthy platform participates
Table 1: Attacks: A Platform joins
Service, applying the regular protocol flow shown above.
4.4 A Platform leaves
Departure of a platform is also initialized by the corresponding platform administrator. The
platform leaves the network, but all its data (reputation values and identification data) is saved
in order to enable the recurrence of the platform.
Protocol flow
The platform informs the network affiliates about the platforms aim. The chord DHT re-
arranges the responsibility for data which was placed at the leaving node. If the platform
leaves the network without notifying its affiliates, the DHT automatically rearranges data and
responsibilities analogously after a certain time, because of the maintenance tasks described in
section 4.1.
4.5 A Platform is excluded
If a platform has a reputation value below a certain threshold it is not considered as being
trustworthy any more. This platform is then excluded from system activities.
Protocol flow
After any platform has noticed, that a given platform is not trustworthy any more, it removes
all references to it from its chord finger table and denies possibly incoming requests from that
platform. All trustworthy platforms act in this way, so that not trustworthy platforms are
excluded from the overlay network. Data and responsibilities of a not trustworthy platform
are rearranged as if the platform had left the system. In order to prevent this platform from
joining the network again, the platform identification data is kept in a list of (formerly) known
platforms. This is also necessary to be able to verify data that has been created by the excluded
platform, while it has been trustworthy in the past. The Communication Service of a platform
also ceases communication with not trustworthy platforms.
Counter measures against attacks
Participating in the network can occur in two ways: Request-response communication via the
Communication Service and saving data in the chord DHT via the Data Service. The former is
handled by the Communication Service of the receiving platform, which will block all requests
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PA6 Non-trustworthy platform participates
Table 2: Attacks: a Platform is excluded
from no more trustworthy platforms. The latter is prohibited by the mechanisms of the chord
DHT described above, which only provides.
4.6 An agent registers
This section describes the use case of registering a new agent. There are two cases of agent
registration: in the first a completely new agent registers, in the second case an agent that
has participated in reputation management before registers again. Every agent that wants to
take part in the reputation management system has to register properly and agents should not
cooperate with agents, that are not registered with the reputation management system.
Protocol flow
For each agent a unique identifier for each participating agent is assumed, which is managed
by the agent platform that hosts the agent. As each platform also has a unique identifier each
agent can be identified unambiguously by a combined identifier consisting of its the platform
identifier and its own identifier.
A completely new agent registers with this identifier. The Security Service creates a new key pair
for the agent, used signatures during its participation in the reputation management network.
To create this key pair an asynchronous ciphering algorithm is used (for the prototype: RSA).
After that a new agent-identification data structure (see 4.2) containing the agents identifier
and public key, is created and saved in the DHT.
The Lease Service of all nodes responsible to save the identification data structure start a lease
for the joining agent. This is considered as successful if at least one node has started the lease
correctly, otherwise an exception occurs and the agent cannot register. The timespan used for
agent leases is a global constant.
Finally the private and public key, and the timespan for the initiated lease are returned to the
agent. Thus the agent has all information it needs for participating, like its key pair and the
lease time, and is therefore correctly affiliated with the network.
In case the agent has formerly participated in the network it can return and register providing
not only its identifier but also its reputation data, which were provided to it when it left the
system.
To register again the Security Service will check if the provided identifier of the agent matches
the one for which the reputation data is valid. If the identifier is correct it verifies the signatures
of the reputation data, which are considered correct if it is signed correctly from two different
platforms, the agent itself and each reputation value by the agent which rated. If any error
occurs during these tests registration fails.
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After this step another platform has to verify the data a second time to save it within the
DHT. For this purpose another platform responsible for the agent-identification data structure
is chosen If there is no such platform, any other platform is chosen and the reputation data
structure is sent to it in order to be verified.
On the other platform the Security Service once again checks the signatures . After correctly
verifying the signatures the reputation data is passed on to the Data Service. The Data Service
finally updates the reputation data in the DHT to the valid values. After that the agent, is
successfully registered again.
Each agent has to renew its Lease before it expires. If a lease is not renewed in time the
responsible Lease Service rates the agent with a poor reputation value. This reputation value is
assigned to a special role called System. This role reflects the behavior of an agent in interaction
with the reputation management system and is further described in section 4.8. When a lease
is renewed correctly, it is reset in all Lease Services of the responsible platforms and a new lease
containing the new timespan is returned to the agent.
Counter measures against attacks
An agent leaving the system with his reputation data structure can, in case the reputation
AA5 Change of identity
Table 3: Attacks: an Agent registers
is very bad, be tempted to come back with a new identifier (Attack AA5). Since neither the
participating agents in the network nor the platform, the agents registers to, can prove the
identity of this agent a counter measure for this attack outside the reputation management
system is required. A new agent can be identified by any other agent as it has no reputation
values assigned to it. So each agent can decide if it wants to cooperate with a new agent.
An agent can also keep its identifier and return without its reputation data. In this case the lease
mechanism will ensure that the reputation data kept within the system will be of very bad value
when the agent returns after a certain timespan. Therefore it will always be disadvantageous
to come back with its old ID but not with its checked out reputation data structure.
In case the registering agent comes back with a reputation data structure belonging to another
agent, even if it took over the other agent identifier, it would not be able to register because
of the invalid signatures on the reputation data . If the agent also possesses the private key of
the other agent there is no way to prevent the agent from registering correctly.
Finally the agent could try to leave the system once it has a very good reputation, save this
reputation and return. After that it could behave bad, de-register and try to register again
using the good reputation data saved before. To avoid this the up-to-date reputation data,
handed out to each agent, is stored in a queue on the platforms responsible to manage data
of this agent. If the agent registers again this reputation data can be compared with the data
the agent provides. This way an agent can only register with its up-to-date reputation data
structure.
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4.7 An agent de-registers
In the following section de-registration of an agent from the reputation management system
is illustrated. The system also allows agents to leave the system and come back with their
accumulated reputation data.
Protocol flow
An agent de-registers from the plug-in, running on its platform, by providing its identifier.
The Reputation Service of this platform first retrieves the data structure describing the agent.
For each role listed in this data structure the Reputation Service retrieves all reputation data
saved in the chord DHT and creates a new data structure that the agent can save. This way any
agent which has been participating in the network before can come back with its accumulated
reputation data, related to the point in time on which it has left the network.
After assembling all the relevant reputation data for the leaving agent it gets signed with the
platforms private key. A second platform to sign the data structure is a platform that is
responsible for the data of the agent or if there is no such platform any other platform in the
network. If no other platform can be found in the network the de-registration of the agent is
considered to be failed.
Counter measures against attacks
With help of this protocol the same attacks as in section 4.6 are addressed.
4.8 An agent rates other agents
During the process of rating other agents the three essential concepts are used: a so-called
ticket, a so-called packet, and a special role named System Role.
The ticket is a data structure, which all agents taking part at the transaction have to sign.
It is issued by the reputation management system and also signed by all platforms that are
responsible to manage data for the agent, that requested the ticket. A ticket is provided by
reputation management on a per transaction basis. The ticket is signed by each participating
agent. For this purpose an agent adds a time stamp (of its local time) to the ticket and signs
it. The time stamp allows ordering of transactions for each agent without requiring a global
time. The ordering is required for reputation management to decide which ratings are the most
recent for each agent. The ticket testifies that all agents, which added a signature, agree to
participate in the cooperation4.
Closely related to a ticket is a data structure called packet, which is created on request of an
agent by the reputation management serivce fter all relevant agents have signed a ticket. All
4This can be extended with details of the underlying joint commitment of the cooperation to be further
integrated into the CPS process and provide more information about the context of the cooperation.
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rating values (per rating agent, rated agent, and role of rated agent) applying to this transaction
are stored in this data structure. In order to make ratings verifiable and non-manipulable every
rating value is signed by the agent providing it.
The ratings contained within a packet are stored within the DHT in a data structure called
valuation. There is a list of valuations for each agent and each role played by that agent. The
valuation contains the identifier of the agent that provided the rating, the value of the rating,
the ticket of the transaction associated with the rating, and signatures the platforms that were
responsible to create the ticket and associated packet in order to testify the authenticity of the
valuation.
Related to ticket and packet is a special role called System Role, whose valuations are set by
the reputation management system. If an agent orders a packet a lease is created. If this lease
expires before an agent returns a packet, the agent gets a poor rating for the System Role.
Valuations can only be issued until the lease has expired. The valuation of an agent for the
System Role is provided with every request of the reputation of an agent. Therefore other
agents can conclude if an agent conforms to the rules of the reputation management. The use
of the System Role encourages an agent to return a ticket and packet it has ordered before. An
agent is also being rated in its System Role, if the lease expires that represents the presence of
an agent within the system
If an agent wants to cooperate with and rate other agents, a ticket has to be ordered first.
Then the ticket has to be signed by all agents taking part in the transaction to avoid faked
transactions. After the transaction every agent involved can rate every other involved agent in
one ore more particular roles by signing and adding a reputation value to the packet.
Protocol flow
According to section 3 all services beside the Consistency Service are involved in this protocol.
The agent that initializes the cooperation (agent I in the following) requests a new Ticket from
its platform and states an expected duration of the intented cooperative work and its identifier.
The ticket is created and signed by the platform, signed by another trusted platform, and then
returned to the requesting agent. The expected duration and the identifier are stored within
the ticket for later use.
Agent I passes around the ticket to all agents participating in the cooperative work. Each agent
signs the ticket and thus signals readiness for cooperation. Additionally they add their local
time stamp to get an unambiguous ordering of each agents ratings later.
After all relevant agents signed the ticket, agent I requests a Packet from its platform. The
agent therefore passes the signed ticket to the platform, which checks if agent I is part of the
reputation network and if the ticket is valid. If both checks return satisfactorily, the platform
requests ticket leases from platforms that are also responsible for storage of data about
Agent I, (called platforms L in the following) for the duration stored within the ticket. These
platforms also verify the ticket. If this succeeds the lease is created on each platform L and
the platform creates a signature for the packet to testify that it is valid. The packet is then
returned to agent I.
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After the cooperation has finished, agent I passes around the packet to all participating agents,
which store their rating values for each other in the packet. Every agent has to sign its ratings
to ensure traceability of who gave which rating to whom and data integrity.
After all relevant agents have stored their rating values, the packet can be provided to any
platform. The platform then asks platforms L, whether the packet is still valid (the lease has
not expired), which is determined by looking at the corresponding leases. If the packet is
still valid each platform L provides a signature that testifies timely return of the packet. For
this purpose not only the lease is checked but also each rating value is checked for a proper
signature. If all platforms L testified with their signature that the packet is valid, the platform
which received the packet creates a valuation data structure for each rating of an agent and
stores it within the DHT. If the ticket lease expired, the whole Packet is ignored after agent
I has already been punished.
A packet can be returned to any platform by any agent. Therefore a packet is valid until ratings
for each combination of agents taking part at the cooperation has been stored in the DHT or
the lease has expired. This is considered by the Lease Service of the platforms L.
Counter measures against attacks
Against the following attacks counter measures are taken here: Attack AA2 cannot be excluded
AA2 Faked transactions
AA3 Faked ratings
AA4 Harmful rating
AA6 Avoid rating by other agents
Table 4: Attacks: an Agent rates other agents
completely. A plug-in cannot make sure, that a transaction is really carried out. It is only
possible to verify ratings by the means of checking the signatures of the ticket, the valuations
and the distributed running ticket lease. To impair the unmeant effects of faked ratings (attack
AA3) only one rating per agent pair and role is used to calculate the reputation value. So there
are no effects to the complete system when two agents are trying to fake transactions.
Attack AA4 includes two cases: The first one - the packet is not signed by all agents involved
- is completely excluded. If such a packet comes back to a platform, it is ignored, because not
all agents rated in this structure have signed the ticket. The second case occurs if an agent
signs a ticket and is rated harmful although it has done its job well. This problem is again
out of the range of our plug-in, but is also impaired as in item AA3 above. All valuations to
save have to be signed by the rating agent. If a malicious platform saves a not correctly signed
valuation anyway, it is not considered when the reputation values are requested and calculated
afterwards (Refer to the next section 4.9).
To avoid attack AA6, the cooperating agents themselves have to pay attention that all agents
cooperating with them have signed the ticket. Otherwise they cannot give any ratings to them.
So, the agents, which are not listed in the ticket, could possibly not cooperate without any
personal (negative) consequences.
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4.9 Reputation of an agent is retrieved
Another protocol which is covered in this subsection is the retrieval of agent reputation. The
retriever has to provide the role and the agent identifier of the agent whose reputation has to
be retrieved. As answer to this request the reputation of this agent playing the system role and
the reputation of the platform that host the agent are also returned by the Reputation Service.
Protocol flow
First of all the request is forwarded to the Reputation Service. The Reputation Service in turn
requests the valuations associated with the agent via the Data Service. These values are re-
turned in historical order. Through a generic assignable calculating mechanism the Reputation
Service calculates the actual value including the agent’s values of the specified role and the
system role. The newer ratings should usually be weighted higher than the older values.
Before answering the request, the Reputation Service has to compare the reputation of the
platform with the marginal value (yellow card). Should the value be below this marginal value,
the agent gets an alert. It is allowed to decide on its own, if it will work with a probably good
agent on an evil platform.
Counter measures against attacks
All ratings are saved in priority queues, in which the most actual rating is at the beginning of
AA1 Pretending to be trustworthy
PA3 Fake of reputation data
Table 5: Attacks: Reputation of an agent is retrieved
the queue. To calculate the overall reputation value a formula like exponential smoothing (see
also [PSEP01]) should be used, in order to weigh the actual ratings stronger.[Pad00] Thus this
is a counter measure against attack AA1 because the effect of good valuations at the beginning
of the participation in the network will fade out over time. To avoid the problem, created by
attack PA3, all signatures of every rating are verified. So no other platform is allowed to fake
ratings or create arbitrary rating values.
4.10 Checking consistency of data
This section describes how data consistency is checked in the plug-in. To achieve this the
different internal steps necessary for a consistency check are explained. The consistency checks
are an important function within the network in order to make sure that only properly working
platforms are participating, which is crucial because all agents affiliated with the network rely
on services provided by the platforms (e.g. the proposed plug-in). Since this plug-in is applied
to open MAS the consistency checks exist to verify the accuracy and correctness of the saved
data and measure the reliability of participating platforms.
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Protocol flow
In general for this plug-in is assumed to control that the reliability of data has to be checked.
Thus every platform acts for the agents hosted by it and triggers a consistency check after a
certain number of events for the data concerning its agents.
Since it makes sense to conduct the consistency check only if there are at least two platforms
in the network, the consistency checks in the network of one platform are disabled.
Agent Reputation Consistency Checks and Platform Reputation Consistency Checks verify the
consistency of the distributed saved reputation data of agents and platforms. Platforms are
considered to be a special type of agent.
Agent Data Consistency Checks and Platform Data Consistency Checks verify the consistency of
the distributed saved identification data of agents and/or platforms. For any of the consistency
checks the platform manager on a certain platform chooses a random agent identifier or its
platform identifier to be verified and starts the test.
First of all the Platform Manager fetches the data from the chord DHT with help of the Data
Manager. It After that the data is sorted on the original data and replicas. The original data
is compared in order to determine a majority of correct data. The replica data is compared
with the original only. Whether the original had a right data or not is not considered.
On the next stage the platforms with correct data are rewarded with a good reputation value
and the platforms with incorrect data are punished with a bad reputation value. The reputation
values are signed with help of the local Security Service and saved in the chord DHT with help
of the local Data Service.
Counter measures against attacks
The whole consistency check concept is solely introduced to reveal platform behaviors like
PA1 Refusal of service
PA2 Reputation data manipulation
PA3 Fake of reputation data
Table 6: Attacks making Consistency Check necessary
the ones described in attacks PA1, PA2 and PA3. Whenever one of these is discovered the
corresponding platform will get a bed rating and, if it continues acting incorrect, eventually be
excluded from the network.
5 Implementation in Java
This section describes how the reputation management system, which is proposed in the pre-
ceding sections, is implemented in Java and with help of an existing chord implementation5
5http://open-chord.sourceforge.net/
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which is also implemented in Java [KL06].
5.1 Interface of the plug-in
To provide only one interface to the agent platform and the agents hosted by it the facade
pattern is used. It defines
”
a higher-level interface that makes the subsystem easier to use.“
[GHJV04] For users of the plug-in the whole complexity is hidden through this interface. Details
of all protocols described in the preceding sections (e.g. request of a reputation value) are trans-
parent to the agents and to the platform. This facilitates change of the internal implementation
of reputation management without changing the applications using it.
This section contains a description of the interface used in our implementation: de.uniba.-
wiai.lspi.trust.trustservice.TrustManager. The methods of this interface can be divided
into two categories: methods for platforms and methods for agents.
Methods for platforms
In order to join the open MAS, a platform has to provide its public key when calling the
method platformLogin. A specific number of trusted platforms decides if the platform is
accepted or not by signing its public key. To leave the network regularly, a platform has to
call the method platformLogout. This method ensures that all responsibilities are rearranged
within the reputation management system.
Methods for agents
The method agentLogin is provided with two different signatures. The first one, which contains
no parameters is for new agents, which are registering with the network for the first time. The
second one is the login for returning agents with a list containing signed reputations. In case
an agent leaving the platform the agentLogout method provides the possibility to perform
a logout. A list of double-signed reputation values is returned. The agent has to store its
reputation, if it wants to provide it when registering again.
The method getAgentRep provides the possibility to agents to request a reputation value of
another agent in a specified role. The returned data also contains informations about the
reputation values of the platform the agent is running on and the reputation value of the agent
regarding the System Role. Using the concept of leases for agents, there has to be a possibility
to renew them. This can be performed by the method renewAgentLease.
According to section 4.8 methods to order a ticket (newTicket), to sign a ticket to signalize
that a agent wants to take part in a transaction (addSignature) and to order a new packet
(newPacket) are required. After a transaction has finished the agent provides the Packet with
the ticket and the signed reputation values by method setAgentRep back to the plug-in.
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5.2 Implementing the architecture with Java
This subsection describes how the architecture described in section 3 is implemented in the pro-
totypic implementation and which patterns are used. First however, the general structure of
packages will be described. For each service described in section 3 a package with a correspond-
ing implementation of the service exists. Each such package consists of at least one interface
which provides the methods to access the service implementation. The packages dataser-
vice6, reputationservice and securityservice encompass more than one interface each,
because they provide individualized interfaces to some of the other services. Furthermore, each
package uses a kind of static factory method provided by an additional class combined with a
kind of singleton to ensure that each service can be instantiated only once. This method has
been implemented in an additional class, which ensures, that there is only a single instance
implementing the interface, that provides access to a service.
5.2.1 Layer 3
On layer three there is only the package trustservice. It contains only the interface explained
in section 5.1 and its implementation, which forwards the request to the services concerned with
the desired functionality. Which services are concerned depends on the method that is called.
Like suggested in [GHJV04], a mediator pattern is used in all these cases. According to Gamma
et al. the mediator pattern
”
defines an object that encapsulates how a set of objects interact.“
[GHJV04]. In out implementation the steering object is the service, which has the main job
to do concerning a method. For example if
”
An agent rates another agent“ (section 4.8) or
”
Reputation of an agent is retrieved“ (section 4.9) the Reputation Service manages all actions
and acts as the mediator.
5.2.2 Layer 2
To ensure that in each plug-in only one instance of each service is created, a kind of singleton
pattern has been used as described above. If this instance is not existing jet, it is instantiated
now. Instantiation of the Trust Service is performed by the agent platform using the plug-in,
whereas the other services are initialized the first time they are requested by another service.
By this pattern it can be ensured that all services of one plug-in are e.g. using the same Data
Service. As a consequence using this static factories, only one plug-in can be instantiated in a
single Java Virtual Machine (JVM).
For many use cases the Reputation Service is the mediator of all actions occurring while
answering the request. Another pattern, which has been used here, is the Strategy Pattern.
This behavioral pattern is used to make algorithms interchangeable. [GHJV04]
In the reputation management service the pattern is used to make the reputation metric and
representation of reputation values exchangeable. First of all the metrics used for reputation
and ratings is declared as soon as the Trust Service is instantiated. When a platform joins a
6The prefix de.uniba.wiai.lspi.trust is cut of from all package names for simplicity
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MAS it must be checked that it uses the same strategy as the platforms already part of the
network do.
Figure 4 presents the strategy implemented in our reputation management system. Reputa-
tionContext in this figure represents any service that must use the reputation values or metric.
The strategy itself is represented by the class ValueTypeInformation and consists of the metric
(Rating)and reputation value representation ValueType. An instance of this class containing
the concrete ValueType and Rating is passed to the Trust Service when it is created. In this
prototype two different ValueTypes are implemented: A so-called FloatValueType, which can
contain float values between zero and one, and the ValueType Grade, which demonstrates the
German school grade system between one (best grade) and six, whereas only integers are al-
lowed. Through the generic architecture of our system, new ValueType implementation can be
added, which extend de.uniba.wiai.lspi.ss05.pi3.trust.model.ValueType.
Figure 4: The metric strategy pattern
The strategy consists of a concrete ValueType and a metric Rating that can compute reputation
values from this ValueType. Our prototype provides two alternative metrics, which can be used
with FloatValueType. The first one, a very simple one, is the unweighted average. All ratings,
which are requested from the Data Service, are just added and after that divided through
their quantity. The alternative, called RatingFloatES, is more recommendable (compare to
[PSEP01]). It is based on exponential smoothing. So newer ratings are weighted more and the
protection against attack AA1 is much better than using the other alternative. Among other
things the configuration of the values for the exponential smoothing (like weights) depends on
the system size. They can be denoted in a configuration file and are independent from the
values of other platforms in the system.
Main tasks of the Platform Service are to manage the join procedure of a platform and to
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ensure the consistency of the distributed data in the chord DHT. These Consistency Checks
proceed after a certain time span and check the data of agents running on the local platform.
Consistency Checks are performed as described in 4.10. To speed up the checking instead of
comparing each value the mechanisms provided by the Reputation Service is used to calculate
a actual reputation value which is compared afterwards.
Managing agent and ticket leases is the main task of the Lease Service. To avoid attacks based
on cooperation between a platform and an agent running on that platform, agent leases are not
managed on the platform hosting that agent. They are stored on the platforms responsible to
host the identification data of that agent. Also ticket leases are distributed in this fashion and
for the same reason. Leases are stored in special local data structures which are periodically
checked by a thread. When one of the leases on this platform expires, the agent to that the
lease belongs is rated harmful with help of the Reputation Service. If the request to extend a
lease or extend the deadline for rating of a transaction associated with a ticket arrives in time,
the dataset will be removed so that the lease cannot expire any more. The different platforms
responsible for the lease do not coordinate with each other to ensure that a lease really expired.
This is not necessary as any inconsistencies that may arise are detected by the Platform Service
and can be repaired later on.
All data and communication has to be verified with help of the Security Service. In general
the Security Service is implemented based on the packages java.security and javax.crypto.
For our reputation management system an asymmetrical ciphering algorithm for the key pairs
of every participant and a symmetrical ciphering algorithm to be able to provide the Pretty
Good Privacy (PGP) Protocol [Zim95] for communication between platforms is required.
To create the key pairs (java.security.KeyPair) for every participant in the network (agents
and platforms) java.security.KeyPairGenerator is applied with a asymmetrical algorithm,
that is set to the same value for the whole MAS. This must also be ensured when a platform
joins a MAS. Currently RSA is used for that purpose. To create the symmetrical keys used for
the PGP Protocol the javax.crypto.KeyGenerator with the DESede (Triple DES) algorithm
was used. All the keys are generated by an instance of the class called KeyGenerator located in
the securityservice package. All sign-able data structure classes are derived from the class
TrustStruct. To add a signature to such a TrustStruct the following steps are proceeded:
First the data structure to be signed is converted into a byte array. Then java.security.-
Signature class is used to create a byte array that represents the signature for the TrustStruct.
This is created using the private key, given as an argument, from the participant signing the
TrustStruct, and a signature algorithm (to be able to use the created RSA keys SHA1WITHRSA
is used). Finally after creating the signature for the TrustStruct a new SignedTrustStruct
instance is created containing the signed TrustStruct, the signers identifier, the signature and
a flag indicating if or if not the SignedTrustStruct may be signed again. Every additional
signature created for this data structure is created using the same mechanisms. Since there can
be a need to distinguish between signature of an agent a platform, SignedTrustStruct contains
two data structure to store either signatures of agents or platforms. Instances of TrustStruct
and their signatures are encapsulated in instances of SignedTrustStruct to make it possible
to distinguish between the instance without signature and with signature.
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To verify a signature again java.security.Signature is used. Providing the signed object (ex-
tracted from a SignedTrustStruct) (converted into a byte array) the byte array representing
the signature and the corresponding public key the signature is verified. The SecurityMan-
agerImpl object acts as a mediator for this action: it converts the signed object, using the
SignatureUtil object, and retrieves the public key for the participant of the network which
signed the object. All conversion, signing and verification is carried out in the SignatureUtil
object also within the securityserivce package.
The Security Service also provides facilities to secure communication between agent platforms
based on PGP used by the Communication Service on layer 1.
Each message of a message session is enciphered with help of a symmetric session key. In order to
provide the symmetric session key to the remote communication partner it has to be enciphered
with help of the communication partner’s public key. To achieve this the secret session key is
asymmetrically enciphered with the other party’s public key with help of javax.crypto.Cipher
is used. By providing the public key of the recipient the secret key is enciphered asymmetrically
and returned as a byte array. To decrypt a encrypted secret key on the recipient platform
javax.crypto.Cipher is used again. All these actions have been encapsulated in a class called
CipherUtil within the securityservice package, while the SecurityManager object again
acts as a mediator.
In order to symmetrically encrypt the actual message objects the message is converted into a
byte array and then again enciphered by javax.crypto.Cipher (using the symmetrical algo-
rithm and the secret session key now). Analogously the byte array representing the encoded
message object is decoded, using javax.crypto.Cipher and the secret key, on the platform
receiving the message.
5.2.3 Layer 1
Although there already exists a communication network for the chord DHT, the reputation
management service has to provide the communication between interacting platforms. There-
fore the Communication Service offers methods to contact remote platforms for specific tasks
of the other Services. Throughout there is need to send remote method calls to other plat-
forms e.g. to request a signature from that platform. For this purpose a service invokes the
corresponding method of the Communication Service. On the remote platform the local Com-
munication Service delegates the call to the responsible services.
For the communication between platforms the PGP Protocol has been chosen. According to
that protocol messages are enciphered with a symmetrical session key known to both parties of
the communication session. To initiate such a communication and therefore publish the secret
session key to the other party the first message of such a session will consist of the following
parts: the message object, enciphered using the secret session key and the secret session key
enciphered with the other party’s public key. This way the other party can decipher the session
key and thus decode the whole message. And furthermore the session key is now known to
both parties of the communication session. The means to en-/decipher messages are provided
by the Security Service.
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The Data Service in a class called DataManager which is responsible for saving data within the
chord implementation or to retrieve data from it. How this is done, is transparent to the layers
above. Within chord data replication is already implemented to ensure that no data is lost
when a peer crashes. However, this kind of replication only means, that data from one peer
is stored on a number of succeeding peers. This type of replication is not sufficient to avoid,
that a peer which is responsible for storing data, is unnoticed changing data, because there is
no reference data to compare the stored data with. Therefore, in addition to the replication
already implemented in chord, the Data Service stores each data item on more than one peer.
This yields in several advantages:
• By retrieving data several times from chord and comparing these items, the DataManager
is able to recognize if a platform has changed data or removed data.
• After recognition of data change the Data Service saves his findings in a queue which can
be accessed by other services (e.g. the Platform Service). Thus, the DataManager can
report malfunctioning platforms indirectly.
• The DataManager can prevent provision of inconsistent data to higher layers. It can do
so by retrieving the requested data several times from chord, performing a majority check
and returning the data which was found to be correct.
For each data item the DataManager wants to store within chord, it has to create a unique
identifier. To store data several times within chord, the DataManager simply creates a (con-
figurable) number of identifiers for a single item and stores the item several times, associated
with each identifier. How many identifiers are created for each item, i.e. how often each item
is stored within Chord, has to be specified while initializing the DataManager. This value is
globally set for all platforms and their DataManager within the reputation management system.
The majority check mentioned above is implemented with help of a private method and tries
to determine from a list of data those data that represent a majority. This private method is
called from every method that retrieves data from the chord DHT. The number of data items
that represent an absolute majority is calculated first. Then the data items are compared with
each other until an absolute majority has been found. One data item from this majority is then
returned. If there is no absolute majority found, the data represented by a simple majority is
returned. This indicates however, that there are inconsistencies within the chord DHT. This
information is stored using a flag, which can be read by other Managers (e.g. the platform
manager to check for inconsistencies).
Since data items are stored several times within chord, the DataManager has to ensure, that
the stored data is consistent. This has to be done especially to prevent that an agent platform
is punished for storing incorrect data. There are two things, the DataManager has to do. First,
it must prevent that wrong data is stored on its own platform or that data is missing on its
own platform. Secondly, the DataManager must provide the already mentioned means to find
inconsistencies within chord, thus enabling the punishment of the responsible agent platforms.
Some operations which are provided by the DataManager are context sensitive, i.e. in some
cases they may be performed, in other cases, they may be not, depending on the type of data
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that would be affected by the operation. These operations are insertion, deletion and update of
data. If an operation may be performed is not checked by the DataManager, but within chord.
However, there had to be some additional DataManager methods to support those checks and
the chord implementation had to be extended with security features.
Since the DataManager stores data several times within chord and for every request all data
items have to be retrieved to perform a majority check, data requests are expensive. Therefore,
it is reasonable to cache data, which do not change anymore. In the current implementation
this data is stored in a local map within the DataManager and not removed anymore. In case
the plug-in is developed any further, it surely is sensible to remove data from this map using
a scheme that has still to be defined. One could e.g. remove the oldest entries after a certain
time, or one could remove those entries, which are used seldom.
5.2.4 Layer 0
Communication of the plug-in is based on two technologies. On one side agent platforms have
to communicate directly and on the other side they use a DHT -namely chord- to store data in
a P2P network. The DHT itself again uses Java sockets to facilitate communication between
single agent platforms. This section first describes how direct communication between agent
platforms is implemented using Java Sockets. Afterwards it is explained how an already existing
implementation of a chord overlay network uses Java Sockets and is extended to fit the require-
ments for application in an environment where non-trustworthy peers may be incorporated.
Socket communication The provided send-methods of the Communication Service Interface
facilitate remote method calls. Before a message is sent to another platform there is a check if
the receiver address is the own address of the platform. This can happen when e.g. the Lease
Service has to send a message to all responsible platforms of a specific agent for whom it is
responsible too. Then there is no remote call over the network but a local call to the responsible
Service of the local platform. When the receiver address and the local platform address are
different the message has to be sent over the network. Therefore the message is enciphered,
signed, and with the so-called secret key packed into an envelope. The secret key represents
the session key for one interaction session of two platforms. An envelope is a data structure
that contains the sender address, the receiver address, the type of the message, the encrypted
message and finally the secret key encrypted with help of the receivers public key. The next
step is to open a new socket to the receiver platform and to send the envelope. Now the socket
waits for a response from the receiver platform. Thus, the communication is synchronous for
the service that calls the method. The incoming result message can contain an object or an
exception. The object must be of the type of the method that has been called and serves
as return value. If it is not an exception is raised. The exception -if present- represents an
exception that occurred on the remote platform. So that the socket has not to wait infinitely,
a timeout is set. If the timeout elapses an exception is thrown. All send methods operate this
way.
To receive messages the Communication Service makes use of a multi-threaded server pattern
The class ServerSocketListener provides a server socket, that enables the plug-in to listen
30 5 IMPLEMENTATION IN JAVA
for incoming messages which have to be of the type envelope. Incoming envelopes are checked
on the message type they contain based on which the right method can be called by the
Communication Service.
A mechanism to avoid denial-of-service attacks is implemented in the socket layer. To achieve
this a remote platform is only allowed to send a configurable number of requests in a certain
(also configurable) period of time. Finally a malicious platform, that exceeds the number of
requests is added to a blocked platform list. From platforms on that list no incoming requests
are accepted anymore. After a globally set period of time a platform is removed from the list of
blocked platforms. This mechanism guarantees the performance of the plug-in because without
it a malicious platform would be able to send thousands of envelopes with messages which have
to be decrypted. Such an attack would probably slow down the plug-in enormously since the
decryption process is expensive.
When an incoming message is received, the ServerSocketListener checks if the requesting
platform is allowed to send an envelope at all. Then the ServerSocketListener updates the
number of requests received from that platform. Assumed the platform is still allowed to send
requests, the ServerSocketListener instantiates a class called RequestHandler, which has its
own thread of control and is provided with the socket representing the just opened connection.
The RequestHandler expects an envelope as incoming message on its socket. Hence, if the
incoming object is not an envelope the request is ignored, the connection is closed and the
thread is terminated. If the incoming object is an envelope, a second security check is applied,
that checks if the requesting platform is trustable and on that score if the connection is allowed.
Chord implementation An already existing open source Java implementation of the chord
overlay network is adopted to serve as DHT for the implementation of the reputation man-
agement system. This implementation (called Open Chord7 [KL06]) is based on Java sockets
and provides an interface to Java Applications to use the DHT functionality. Synchronous and
Asynchronous methods to lookup, insert and delete data from the DHT are provided. The im-
plementation transparently performs the maintenance of the chord DHT as described in section
4.1. It also transparently replicates data stored within the DHT by copying it to a configurable
number of successors of a peer. Figure 5 presents a high level overview of the Open Chord
architecture.
.
The interfaces AsynChord and Chord provide methods to a Java application (here: our reputa-
tion management system) to lookup a peer responsible for data with a certain identifier and to
insert, delete, update, and retrieve data. AsynChord allows to perform these operations in an
asynchronous fashion while Chord provides methods to synchronously perform these operations.
The communication abstraction layer provides two abstract classes: Proxy and Endpoint.
Proxy represents references to remote peers that a peer holds in its finger table and provides
methods that can be invoked on these remote peers. Endpoint represents the instance that
allows a peer to receive incoming method calls from remote peers.
7http://open-chord.sourceforge.net/
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Figure 5: Architectural overview of Open Chord.
The communication layer is implemented with help of subclasses of Proxy and Endpoint. Proxy
represents a peer at a remote peer and facilitates remote method invocation to the represented
peer. Endpoint represents an instance that listens for incoming method calls for a peer.
For communication over sockets each peer is represented at other peers with help of a so called
SocketProxy. This proxy sends requests for method invocations to the SocketEndpoint of
the peer it represents. For this purpose SocketEndpoint is listening for incoming requests of
other peers with help of a server port and acts as a multi-threaded server. For each method
(e.g. retrieve/insert an entry from/into the DHT) a message is send over a socket to the remote
SocketEndpoint by a SocketProxy.
As this implementation of chord assumes that all participating peers are benevolent and trust-
worthy some modifications and security enhancements have to be made. These add-ons and
changes are described in the following paragraphs.
TrustSecureAccess The socket communication layer of Open Chord has been extended
to use an instance of a security manager. Each SocketProxy and SocketEndpoint holds
a reference to the security manager of the local peer. This security manager on the one side
checks if an outgoing method request with help of a SocketProxy is permitted. On the other side
SocketEndpoint uses it to check if incoming requests are valid and the requested method may be
performed by the requesting remote peer. The security manager can also be used to verify, sign,
and en-/decipher messages send by a SocketProxy. In section 5.2.3 has been mentioned, that
for the operations insert, delete and update, checks have to be made whether these operations
are permitted. The security manager provides a method that checks permission for each method
that can be called from a remote peer provided by Proxy respectively SocketProxy.
The security manager instance must be set before a chord overlay network is joined by a peer. If
no security manager is set a standard security manager which permits all outgoing and incoming
methods to be performed without being verified etc. is used.
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TrustSecureAccess is the security manager implementation provided to be used with our rep-
utation management system. It holds references on the local DataManager, the local Security
Service and the local Reputation Service to perform its tasks. To ensure that critical messages
(e.g. messages that request the removal of a data set) are only considered if they were sent by
registered, well behaving trustworthy agent platforms, these messages have to be signed and
verified. The Security Service provides all crypthography related methods to accomplish this.
As mentioned in section 5.2.3 there are some constraints for the execution of the operations
insert, delete and update. Compliance to these constraints is ensured within TrustSecureAc-
cess. It is checked for what kind of data an operation should be executed and if this execution
is allowed. This decision is based on the trustworthiness of the remote peer and the affected
data. For this purpose the local Reputation Service is used to determine if remote method calls
with help of SocketProxy and incoming method calls via SocketEndpoint are made to/by a
trustworthy remote peer.
The reference to DataManager is required as the identification data of remote peers has to
be retrieved from the chord overlay network itself and DataManager provides these methods.
Therefore the communication within the chord overlay network requires access to the chord
overlay network itself. Because of this fact special care has to be taken to avoid deadlocks.
This required that the join process of a peer must be changed.
In the existing chord implementation joining a chord overlay network and creation of an iden-
tifier for a peer is based on the network address of a peer. This had to be changed in order
to prevent that an agent platform can join the overlay network at a certain point in the chord
ring by choosing a unique identifier on its own and to avoid deadlocks during the join process.
The identifier of a peer determines where it will be located within the chord ring. The identifier
is generated from a data set which contains the identifier of the agent platform it represents,
the public key of that platform and the address of the peer. To join a network a platform first
contacts a platform already part of the MAS with help of its local Communication Service.
From this platform it receives the permission to join the network. To enable the join this
platform inserts the identification data structure of the new platform into the chord DHT. The
identification data first has to be signed by another platform. This platform can check if the data
provided is valid and decline the join of the new platform. Since, the new peer has no means to
influence the signature of the other platform and since the signature is included into the identifier
generating process, the new peer has no control over its identifier and thus no control over where
it will be located within the chord ring structure. Before joining the MAS the platform provides
the assigned identifier for the chord network to its local chord interface. After its identifier being
assigned the new peer has to contact its successor to take over the responsibility for data as
described in section 4.1. The successor with help of TrustSecureAccess tests whether the
joining peer is taking over responsibility for the right data with help of the signed identification
data which has been inserted into the DHT. Only if approved the new node will be able to join
the chord overlay network.
Peers or respectively the agent platforms they represent can become non-trustworthy. There-
fore not only the join process had to be modified, but also peers must sometimes be excluded
from the network. For this purpose the maintenance tasks of peers are exploited. During these
tasks the availability of the predecessor and successor of a peer are checked with help of a
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ping message. If one peer wants to ping another peer, it determines with help of TrustSe-
cureAccess if this is permitted. Based on reputation of the remote peer TrustSecureAccess
then decides if it is still trustworthy. To make this decision TrustSecureAccess has to ask
the local Reputation Service if the other peer is still trustworthy. If a peer is determined to be
trustworthy by the Reputation Service it is stored in a local list within TrustSecureAccess for
a while. Thus, TrustSecureAccess does not have to use the Reputation Service each time it
needs the reputation of another peer. Similarly, non-trustworthy peers are saved in a list. If
the remote peer is non-trustworthy (regardless whether successor or predecessor) it is disposed
from the finger table of the local peer.
If a the endpoint of a peer receives a ping from a remote peer TrustSecureAccess also checks
if that node is still trustworthy. To avoid deadlocks (that can occur as the local peer requires
access to the chord overlay network to check reputation of another peer), the ping is answered
immediately, except if the node is already noted in the list of non-trustworthy peers. If the
ping was answered immediately the reputation check is performed asynchronously with help of
a thread and the ping is discarded the next time if the remote peer is non-trustworthy.
By not communicating with a non-trustworthy peer and removing references to it from the local
finger tables of trustworthy peers it is excluded from the chord overlay network, as it requires
its successor and predecessor relationships.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented a fully decentralized scheme for reputation management in MAS based on
P2P technology. It provides protocols to store, update, and retrieve reputation data for agents
and platforms and to counter measure attacks on reputation management. The application of
our reputation management scheme in many domains is supported by its implementation in
Java, its modular design, and the possibility to exchange the employed reputation metric and
reputation value representation.
Mechanisms to identify and authenticate agents and platforms have been developed and it has
been shown how an existing implementation of a structured P2P overlay network (namely chord
and its Java implementation Open Chord) can be extended and employed to support distributed
reputation management. The mechanisms of our reputation management system allow to rate
agents and their behavior in CPS and behavior of agent platforms regarding provision of the
distributed reputation management service to create reputations for agents and agent platforms.
These mechanisms to identify and authenticate agents and platforms should be extended to rely
on the owner of an agent or a platform, so that more sophisticated methods to prevent attacks
on reputation management are possible. Knowledge about the owner of an agent or a platform
adds extra possibilities to avoid faked ratings and transactions. It also facilitates tracking of
agent and platform owner behavior. For this purpose the data structures to identify agents and
platforms can be extended to also contain the identity of their owners. The owners should have
an identity certified by a trusted third party outside the MAS. To keep track of an owner’s
reputation it would be possible to treat it as a special agent with the special role owner, that
then can be used with the existing mechanisms presented in this paper. Then, it would be
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possible to prevent new platforms or agents of owners with low reputation to enter the MAS,
and this would increase the overall trust in the MAS.
To better integrate CPS and reputation management and to provide more information on the
context of a cooperation, the joint commitment underlying a cooperation should be integrated
into the data structures used during the process of rating agents and into the data structures
representing the reputation of an agent.
To further develop our approach it will be evaluated in different application domains and with
different reputation metrics. An additional step is the extension by services supporting the
ontological dimension (described by [SS02b]) by providing knowledge about roles and their
relationships. These services may be used by all agents to store their experience about the
relationships that exist between roles. This can facilitate the estimation of trust in an agent in
a role based on the relations to other roles.
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